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Abstract:
The link between unemployment and pension accumulations is conceptually
straightforward; periods of unemployment lead to lower pension contributions, and thus
to lower accumulations. However, impacts on accumulation may differ as a result of the
timing and frequency of unemployment spells. We hypothesize that unemployment is
more likely during periods in which the equities market experiences greater than average
returns, largely due to a lead/lag structure of the stock and labor markets, respectively.
This would imply that workers may systematically miss opportunities to purchase
equities through DC plans when prices are relatively low. To test this hypothesis, we
match historic stock returns to stochastically generated unemployment spells for men and
women across the earnings distribution. We find lower income workers suffer greater
percentage losses in retirement savings as a result of more frequent spells of
unemployment. Higher income worker losses are more greatly affected by the timing of
unemployment relative to the equities market.
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1.0

Introduction

Currently, the United States is in the midst of an ongoing pension revolution. Workers’
pension savings once predominantly collected in Defined Benefit (DB) pension programs
are increasingly saved in Defined Contribution (DC) structures. For younger workers the
DB plan has gone the way of the LP record. The ongoing pension revolution has gained a
toehold on the nation’s public pension system, Social Security. Interest in moving Social
Security toward a DC framework continues with many analysts and elected officials
arguing that a move of this sort may reduce the risk of Social Security insolvency.

The new private pension structures have some positive and remarkable qualities. They
allow workers greater labor force mobility, they potentially reduce single firm risks, they
allow explicit ownership of pension assets, and they allow better contouring of
investment and bequest allocations to individual preferences. All of these opportunities
for choice have the potential to empower workers. From the perspective of
unemployment, DC plans protect workers from complete or partial pension loss that
typically occurs when job-loss happens prior to full DB vesting. Many predict that these
changes will positively affect national savings. Poterba, Venti, Wise (1995, 1996, 1998a,
1998b, 2001) have documented the shift toward DC plans, and their work suggests that
net retirement savings increased. Samwick and Skinner, (1998, 2003) Compare DB and
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DC plans directly and predict that most future workers will do better with the average DC
plan1 in their sample.

Along with these positive and remarkable changes come risks inherent in managing
account balances during working years, and in retirement. Without proper management
and diversification, these DC programs expose workers to increased longevity risk
(Brown, 1999; Hurd, 1989), portfolio risk (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001), market timing risk
(Burtless, 1998), and inflation risk, all of which have been discussed at length in the
literature. These many risks inherent to DC plans are diametrically opposed to the
benefits of social insurance offered by large, well-diversified, and adequately funded DB
plans.

The impact of unemployment on DC pension accumulations has not been investigated
previously. We ask whether, and to what extent, missed contributions and the related
timing of investment decisions may reduce retirement savings. In order to save
adequately for retirement, workers must develop accurate expectations about lifetime
workforce absences. Indeed, evidence that equity and labor market performance are
correlated suggests that workers who save through DC-type plans may systematically
miss opportunities to purchase when prices are lowest. This in turn increases the
probability that workers may systematically under-save for retirement.

1

Samwick and Skinner, (1998, 2003) Compare DB and DC plans directly and simulate returns from a
range of plans documented in the SCF. They find that most workers do better with the average DC plan.
Because of the nature of their exercise however they do not include periodic unemployment in their
simulations.
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We consider how much one might expect to lose as a function of unemployment spells,
contingent on worker characteristics. We also investigate the distribution of these losses
to see whether workers might more or less easily anticipate losses. After all, if losses are
small enough, or easy enough to predict, than precautionary savings may afford adequate
protection, whereas if either the loss or the variance surrounding expected loss is too
great, the opportunity to self-insure with precautionary savings is more limited.

In the following sections we discuss the literature related to labor market risk and
retirement savings. However this literature is somewhat imperfectly related to our topic
as it focuses on issues of portfolio management in the context of employment income
risk. We then focus on the specific aspects of labor market risk and its implications for
retirement savings under a system of DC accounts. Following the literature review, we
discuss our data, method, results, and policy implications in the context of employer, and
public pension systems.

2.0

Review of literature and theory

A number of researchers have highlighted a risk inherent in defined contribution plans:
unanticipated shocks to labor income due to business cycle fluctuations. This risk arises
when labor income is considered a non-tradable implicit asset2 that is balanced with
other explicit assets to achieve a household’s optimal portfolio allocation (Campbell et
al., 1999; Storesletten et al., 1998; Viceira, 1999). For instance, if labor income is

2

The value of this asset can be thought of as (PV(E(Labor Income Stream|X)), where X represents a set of
worker attributes.
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riskless, then it is reasonable for a young household’s portfolio to contain mainly risky
assets (Bodie et al., 1991). If labor income is risky but unrelated to financial market risks,
the portfolio allocation in risky assets is projected to be reduced (Viceira, 1999). If labor
income is risky and correlated with financial market returns, households should be more
likely to invest in less risky assets (Campbell et al., 1999).

The relationship between equity and labor market volatility is not well described in the
business cycle literature. One class of models links the equity and labor markets to
inventory shocks and/or measures of corporate profits. As the GDP growth rate declines,
inventories begin accumulating. This accumulation signals to employers their need to
reduce production, and with it demand for inputs. This begins the process by which firms
let go of workers. When the rate of GDP growth accelerates, inventories decline; this
sends the opposite signal to the firm. With increased demand firms begin purchasing
more inputs, including labor. (Marshall, 1890), Elsewhere in the business cycle literature,
authors have considered why labor markets may adjust less rapidly than the markets for
other inputs. Unionization, firm-specific human capital, and high or uncertain search
costs for replacement workers have all been cited as reducing flexibility in the labor
market. (Freeman, Farber, Mortenson, Akerlof & Yellen, respectively). All of these
describe why firms may hesitate to either let go of workers when times are bad, or to
begin hiring when times are good. With either the inventory cycle, or the labor market
frictions model, (or both), similar lead-lad structures between the equities and the labor
market result.
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Empirical consideration of the timing of equity and the labor market is not very prevalent
in research to date. There are a few noteworthy exceptions however. Research by
Domain and Louton (1995), estimate the relationship between US equity indices and the
US unemployment rate. They find negative stock returns are followed by sharp increases
in unemployment. Recoveries are followed by slower reductions in the unemployment
rate; this leads to asymmetry in the onset and recovery of the labor market. Silvapulle and
Silvapulle (1997) find additional evidence of these labor market and equities
asymmetries. They find that negative stock returns have a more pronounced effect on the
labor market than do positive returns.

The empirical relationship between stock market returns and the labor market has been
accepted by those who track and forecast economic conditions. In general, an index of
stock prices is considered a leading indicator. For example, both the Conference Board
and the Bureau of Economic Analysis consider equities a leading indicator. Labor
market indicators however are considered to be leading, coincident, or lagging indicators.
For example, the Conference Board considers initial unemployment claims among its
leading indicators, while the employment of non-agricultural workers is considered to be
coincident, and the duration of unemployment to be a lagging indicator of economic
conditions over the business cycle (Conference Board, 2004).

Previous research and theory make clear that financial and labor markets contain
interrelated risks. However, the full effect of unemployment on savings remains unclear.
From the paragraphs just above, equity markets can reasonably be considered a leading
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indicator of economic performance while labor markets may represent a lagging
indicator. Thus ambiguity on the labor side makes the combined effect unclear a priori.
The timing of unemployment may exacerbate or ameliorate shortfalls in retirement
savings.

To illustrate the case where timing effects increase savings losses, consider a worker who
invests her defined contribution pension exclusively in a broad based index fund
comprising the S&P500 and loses her job shortly after equities decline in value. She has
purchased expensive equities (relative to the drop) during her employment and during her
unemployment spell cannot (does not have the resources to) purchase equities on the
decline; opportunities for dollar-cost-averaging are somewhat muted for a worker in this
situation. Figure 1 gives the reader a conceptual rendering of such a case. Alternative
scenarios may be equally likely. For example, the effect of unemployment on such
pension funds may be in part mitigated if spells of unemployment coincide with periods
of below average investment performance. Thus workers’ expected retirement income
losses could be amplified via a loss of purchasing opportunities or mitigated with a
serendipitous spell of unemployment.

Turnover, earnings and rollover

Workers who are displaced from their jobs have only a limited set of options: retire (exit
the labor force) or seek re-employment. Those who remain in the labor force often have
re-employment wages that are below their previous earnings. There is a large body of
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empirical work, including Baumol, Blinder and Wolff (2002), Farber (2003), and Schmitt
(2004) that finds displaced workers typically experience real wage declines. Schmitt
(2004) finds that 65.3 percent of workers who were displaced from full-time jobs and
found new full-time jobs experienced real weekly earnings declines. Cases of downward
mobility will exacerbate the difficulties in accumulating sufficient retirement savings.

Spells of unemployment reduce retirement contributions, reduce potential long term
returns, and may lead to reductions in future earnings. For those who experience a
downward spiral in labor market outcomes, tapping into retirement savings may be the
only way to preserve a home or maintain a family. When considering rollover there are
but two ways for balances to be affected, downward, or not at all. Several authors find
that workers tend to reduce balances. In particular, (Burman, Coe and Gale, 2000) find
that those with the smallest balances, younger, and lower earning workers are among the
most likely to do so, in the face of tax penalties. For this paper we estimate wage
mobility by quartile using CPS Displaced Worker surveys, from 1994 to 2004, in 2-year
increments, as depicted in Appendix A. In our models, these transition probabilities are
used to estimate switching quartiles after a spell of unemployment and represent wage
mobility.

3.0

Data & Method

We examine the relationship between the probability of job loss and retirement savings
and develop estimates of retirement savings based on simulations of the US economy.
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Our simulations use monthly data from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) for the S&P 500 as a measure of investment returns, and data from the Current
Population Survey for unemployment, earnings and demographics. The simulations hold
constant, both the rates of return on investments and the underlying probability of
unemployment, but allow exogenous shocks of varying sizes to impact the economy
overall. Only when random shocks exceed underlying probabilities are specific workertypes laid off. We then calculate summary statistics for each simulated economy and
record how each of up-to sixteen worker-types do in terms of retirement accumulation
losses and effect of market timing. This exercise is iterated one hundred-thousand times,
and we report the general trends which emerge.

In each period the worker’s account grows or shrinks at a rate based on the total return of
the S&P 500 (including dividends – which are assumed to be reinvested). Patterns of
unemployment matter inasmuch as early spells lead to long periods of lost accumulation,
and because stock returns are volatile.

Data

Throughout this paper we use two primary data sets: the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) monthly data for the S&P500 returns including dividend reinvestment and
the Current Population Survey – Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) files. Both data
sets cover the period from 1979 to 2002. We simulate worker savings in a defined
contribution plan invested solely in a broad-based equity account (represented by the
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S&P 500). Estimates of unemployment rates by wage quartiles and gender are calculated
using the CPS-ORG files. All wages and returns are inflation adjusted using the Bureau
of Economic Analysis’ GDP Implicit Price Deflator to constant 2000 dollars.

CRSP data are monthly; we use end of month prices, as the basis for our calculations and
include dividend returns. These data are accessible to researchers by agreement with the
University of Pennsylvania.

The structure of the CPS data allows us to match individuals across years, effectively
creating a one-year panel data sets (see Madrian and Lefgren 2000 for details on the
matching of persons in CPS data). We measure unemployment as the one year hazard
rate of the experienced unemployed. Only those who were initially employed and then
became unemployed one year later are counted as unemployed in our sample. This allows
us to examine not only the unemployment experience of these workers but also their
earnings prior to a spell of unemployment. The CPS is the optimal data source for
unemployment estimates since it forms the basis of the official unemployment rate
estimates.

Workers are classified into quartiles based on their hourly wage rate prior to
unemployment. Separate earnings quartiles are calculated for men and women. All
quartiles have balanced age profiles, that is, one-fourth of each age group is classified in
each quartile. (This prevents the lowest earnings quartile from being overweighted with
young workers.) We then match each worker to their employment outcome in the
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following year and calculate the probability of being unemployed in each quartile for
men and women. In this way, eight sets of monthly hazards are generated by the
procedure for the period of January 1980 through December of 2002, yielding twentythree years of data. Within this period there are two merges which are not possible 198485 and 1994-95 due to decennial changes in the CPS panel. For these periods (24 months)
we impute a hazard rates using a series of labor market indicators such as the
unemployment rate and employment-to-population ratios3. We also construct two ageearnings profiles for worker types ages 26-30 and 42-46 in 1980. We calculate these two
age-earnings profiles for all sixteen worker types in our simulation model (four earnings
quartiles, gender, cohort).

The other major component of income loss related to spells of unemployment is the
duration of the spell. Clearly, short spells of unemployment are less costly for worker’s
retirement savings. We model unemployment duration based on period-specific duration
distributions using published Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data. The BLS classifies
unemployment duration into four categories: four weeks or less, five to 15 weeks, 16 to
26 weeks, and 27 weeks or more. We re-classify unemployment duration in terms of
discrete weekly segments by using a piecewise linear spline of the durations and
percentages in each category.

3

Imputation results are available from authors upon request.
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To estimate the probability of switching quartiles after a spell of unemployment we use
the CPS displaced worker surveys from 1994 through 2002. These surveys allow us to
determine the pre and post displacement earnings of workers over this time period. We
aggregate all the surveys and calculate a single transition matrix. The matrix estimates the
probability of starting in a particular quartile and ending in another quartile after reemployment. As with the CPS-ORG data, the quartiles are age-adjusted. Appendix A
provides the reader information on income quartile switching in these data.

Finally BEA’s Implicit GDP data are quarterly. These data are made monthly with a
linear deconstruction of changes between observations. In spite of the original data being
quarterly, we chose the GDP deflator since we are interested in controlling for economywide changes in prices (both stock and labor markets are adjusted). The Consumer Price
Index (CPI) or the Producer Price Index (PPI) is too narrowly constructed for our
purposes.

In summary the CRSP, CPS-ORG and CPS-DWS, BLS and BEA data provide five
measures for our analysis. CRSP data provide monthly prices for the S&P500 which form
the basis of our retirement investments. The CPS-ORG files allow us to estimate gender
and earnings-specific unemployment hazard rates while the CPS-DWS allows us to
estimate the wage transition after a spell of unemployment. The BLS provides
information about the distribution of unemployment durations and the BEA provides the
implicit price deflator.
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Method

Our method is to use the underlying unemployment rates, unemployment durations, and
rates of worker mobility between earnings quartile to simulate different earnings and
savings histories for workers by gender, and entering quartile of earnings, over the 19802002 period. We generate a series of stochastic economy-wide shocks which are then
fitted to time specific sensitivities to these shocks (relative probabilities of job loss) by
gender and current earnings quartile. Under these conditions all workers face the same
macro-economy, but differing unemployment hazards and durations generate unique
employment outcomes in the economy.

We take random draws from a uniform distribution to generate the unemployment
outcome. Each month, a new draw is taken and compared to the representative worker’s
baseline unemployment hazard. If the random draw is observed to be below the group
and time specific hazard the worker becomes unemployed. Results are calibrated by
adjusting the range of the uniform distribution so that the average unemployment rate
generated by our simulation approximates the average rate of unemployment for men and
women over 20 from 1980-2002. Once a period of unemployed commences, a second
draw is made to determine the duration of unemployment. Again, the assignment is based
on the published distribution of unemployment durations so that in general drawing
smaller numbers leads to faster exits; however the same draw generates longer durations
in periods when documented durations are longer, and is less damaging when the
opposite is true. The worker is re-employed when the period specified by the second
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draw is completed. Periods are described in months to allow integration with our wage
and stock data. Durations in our simulation are both top coded to be less than or equal to
6 months (26 weeks), and bottom coded to be greater than or equal to 1 month (4
weeks)4. Due to the nature of our sample of unemployment hazards over this period,
while generally workers in lower earnings quartiles may find themselves more quickly
unemployed during downturns; higher quartile earners sometimes face higher
unemployment hazards. Over the period studied, we find that men in the first (lowest)
earnings quartile experience greater hazard that second quartile men 78 percent of the
time, while for the third and forth quartile the numbers are 88, and 95 percent,
respectively. For women the situation is similar, but with a more pronounced hierarchy;
lowest quartile female earners experiencing higher hazard than their second, third, and
forth quartile contemporaries 94, 97, and 100 percent of time, respectively.

While our model allows unemployment incidence to be a measured function of wage
quartile and gender, we take the underlying duration distribution in each month as
constant across all gender and earner groups. This is due to limitations of the BLS
duration data, which are not broken down by wage quartile, or gender. To the extent that
lower-earnings workers have shorter (but more frequent) spells of unemployment this
assumptions may overstate the earnings losses for low income workers while potentially
understating losses for higher income workers.

4

On average, our duration estimates are likely to under-report retirement savings losses. From 1979-2002,
15 percent of unemployment experiences lasted in excess of 26 weeks. When switching directly between
firms, workers often must wait a month or more to join pension plans, and sometimes face transaction costs
in moving DC pension balances. The bottom coded unemployment period in part substitutes for these
types of technical issues affecting overall accumulations.
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At the end of each unemployment period we simulate a final lottery to determine the
earnings quartile he or she will enter. Our transition probabilities determine the
likelihood of landing in a particular earnings quartile for men and women separately. For
example, men previously in the first earnings quartile have a 56 percent chance of staying
in the first quartile, and a 44 percent chance of moving up. For those who move up, a
move to the second quartile is most likely. Conversely, men who become unemployed
while holding a fourth earnings quartile job has a 4% chance of taking a job in the first
earnings quartile, and a 62% chance of staying in their current earnings quartile.
Earnings mobility is assumed fixed across the entire period, transition probabilities are
not allowed to change over time. (These are the average rates reported in Appendix A.)
To the extent that upward mobility is reduced and downward mobility increased during
recessions, this will tend to reduce our measure of timing effects for losses over the
period studied.

Once reemployed, workers again contribute to their DC balances and reenter the lottery
for unemployment. If by chance they become unemployed before earning their first
monthly check, contributions from the employment spell are determined to be zero. The
process continues in this way for the whole period of study. Results reported in either
dollars or time are amplified to make the 23 year (276 month) period of study represent a
40 year career.

There is no explicit process for a worker to switch quartiles without unemployment,
however. This limitation is, arguably, not consequential for two reasons: first, the net
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effect of quartile switching is to damp inter-quartile variation, and not to change central
tendencies; second, quartiles are age-contoured allowing for real wage growth over the
life-cycle. We do not model the effect of plant closures, retooling, or other temporary
layoffs on pension accumulations, which arguably are more important for certain sub
categories of workers. We do not model this because of limitations in our data (for
example we do not know enough about worker subtype, and firm characteristics). To the
extent that we fail to record losses of contribution that may result, these data will under
report the impact of involuntary unemployment on DC pension holdings.

A single economy is defined by three series of economy wide stochastic draws for
unemployment onset, duration, and quartile of rehire. To get a sense of the underlying
patterns of losses one hundred-thousand of these economies are generated. For each
economy 16 generic workers are created, a male and a female worker representing each
quartile, and eight direct counterparts who experience the same number of months of
unemployment, and the same overall quartile mobility, but for whom the unemployment
periods are randomly distributed across time. This allows us to estimate the losses from
unemployment that are due to the particular timing of the calibrated unemployment
probabilities and historic pattern of stock returns. For each worker type, in each
economy, we record the lifetime percent and dollar losses from unemployment against a
counterfactual of full employment. We also record the time unemployed in percent and
in absolute terms, that is in number of months. Finally we report the average monthly
return from the S&P 500 over the periods in which the worker is unemployed.
Comparing the average in-spell rate with the average monthly rate over the period as a
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whole allows one to observe whether returns are systematically higher during periods in
which workers are unemployed.

We structure DC accounts as follows: we assume that there are no retirement savings
account-related transaction costs of unemployment. Second, the employer pays the
administrative costs of retirement savings program. Third, we assume that the
unemployed do not withdraw from these accounts prematurely5. Forth and finally we
assume that all workers invest the same percentage of their pay in the S&P500 with full
reinvestment of dividends, regardless of age, and earnings quartile. With respect to the
patterns of wages and contributions we assume that there is inter-quartile mobility which
follows from the process of unemployment and reemployment as described above. We
assume that once re-employed s/he earns the real median wage of his or her now current
earnings quartile.

At the end of each simulation we compare the balances of workers’ retirement savings
with the retirement balance of a consistently employed worker with similar
characteristics (earnings quartile pattern, basic age-earnings profile, and gender). The
difference of savings and resulting accumulations is attributed to periods of
unemployment. After simulating the twenty-three year economy 100,000 times we
generate descriptive statistics for the universe of outcomes for each initial worker type.

5

We thus assume either that workers finance consumption entirely from their unemployment benefit, or the
existence of other precautionary savings, keeping balances in the DC accounts higher than they might be in
actual job loss situations.
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With this structure we are able to assess real market returns for periods in which workers
are out of the labor force and to compare these to average returns across the entire
observed period, thus we observe any “market timing effects” which might aggravate or
reduce DC pension losses. Finally, we check the outcome of average unemployment rate
across quartiles, and compare that to historic unemployment rates to make sure that our
results do not stem from implausibly large, or small unemployment as observed after the
simulation.

4.0 Results

In our first set of simulations we allow only the unemployment rate in each earnings
quartile to vary. We assume that each worker, regardless of earnings quartile, saves $333
each month. While this assumption is not realistic, it allows us to isolate the effects of
unemployment on retirement savings. Overall, saving $333 per month over 40 years and
investing that sum in the S&P500 with reinvestment of dividends, yields a total
retirement savings greater than that attained by lower income workers who save ten
percent of their wages. Table 1 presents our estimates of the income and percentage
losses associated with spells of unemployment.

For male workers in the lowest quartile of earnings, retirement losses resulting from
spells of unemployment averaged $50,784 across our simulations. For men in the highest
earnings quartile, these losses averaged $28,995. This implies, holding contributions
constant, the lowest quartile of earners would experience retirement savings losses that
are nearly 60 percent larger then their top quartile male counterparts. For women a
18

similar picture emerges. Women’s retirement income losses for the bottom earnings
quartile averaged $45,715 while income losses in the top quartile averaged $19,085 – the
smallest for any group. Perhaps even more interesting is the relationship between
percentage losses of retirement savings and time spent unemployed. In every case, the
percentage of retirement income lost exceeds the time spent unemployed. This is likely
an artifact of the time period we analyze. Since unemployment was the highest in the
early 1980s (early in these workers’ careers) workers’ lower initial savings were
compounded over time. This result may be considerably different for workers who began
employment and saving for retirement in the mid-1990s. Importantly, this illustrates that
early patterns of unemployment create cohort savings effects in much the same way as
long periods of below average equities returns creates replacement rate effects for retirees
(Burtless, 1998).

Our second set of simulations allows for differential savings contributions based on
earnings. We separate workers into two groups based on age: a young cohort aged 26 in
1980 and an older cohort aged 42 in 1980. As expected, allowing for differential
contribution rates changes the totals lost by each earnings group considerably. Tables 2
and 3 show our results for the young and old cohort simulations. For the young cohort,
retirement savings ranged from an average of $260,000 to $793,000 for the lowest- and
highest-earnings quartiles of men. Women saved considerably less, owing to their lower
wages and contributions; savings ranged from $196,000 to $600,000 for the lowest- and
highest-earning female quartiles. Total losses averaged $17,878 older women, $35,752
for older men. Despite the changes in dollar losses due to the differential contribution
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amounts by quartile, the percentage losses by group remain relatively constant. An
average, low earning men (young and old) still lose approximately 8 percent of income
relative to a baseline of no unemployment.

The simulation results presented thus far are largely determined by the unemployment
rate of each group. We calibrated the stochastic component of the simulation so that it
would produce aggregate unemployment rates similar to the United States over the period
of 1980 to 2002. In general, the men’s and women’s average unemployment rate in our
simulation, (5.5 and 4.6 percent, respectively) are near the US averages of 4.8 for men
and women over age 20 and 6.3 percent for men and women over age 16. In general, men
in the lowest earnings quartile of our simulation spend 35.4 months unemployed, while
men in the top quartile spend 19.6 months unemployed (table 4). Overall, women spend
less time unemployed; in our simulations women in the lowest earning quartile spend an
average of 31.8 months unemployed while women in the highest earning quartile average
13.4 months of unemployment.

The retirement income losses illustrated from Tables 1-3 are largely a result of the
foregone contributions to retirement savings resulting from periods of unemployment.
However, these losses are not solely the result of foregone contributions. As previously
discussed part of these losses is due the timing of unemployment spells. To determine the
size of the timing effect we generated a separate but otherwise identical set of 100,000
economies. In this alternate set of economies we require that the same number of months
a person was unemployed be randomly distributed throughout the worker’s lifetime. Thus
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we have a systematic set of losses (partly due to market timing) and a random set of
losses (where the market timing effect has been randomized). By comparing the
difference directly, we can isolate the timing effect. Table 4 presents these results.

Ex ante, it is unclear whether the market timing effect should be positive or negative. The
timing effect could be negative if retirement losses were ameliorated with fortuitous
spell-timing, or conversely, losses could be exacerbated by unfortunate spell timing. In
general, we find that income losses are exacerbated by spell timing. However, we do find
that for those with small losses due to unemployment (30th percentile in the loss
distribution) the timing effect ameliorated some of the unemployment loss. However, on
average spell timing accounts for 9-12 percent of the total losses related to
unemployment.

Table 4 shows the decomposition of the total loss in retirement savings. The timing
column represents the difference between the systematic and random losses. All estimates
are for the younger cohort of workers. A male worker in the first quartile is expected to
lose $1,828 due to the unfortunate timing of his unemployment spells, while a fourth
quartile male worker should expect to lose $3,584 in addition to his $31,974 in foregone
contributions and associated returns. In general, timing losses represent, on average, a 10
percent added loss to the unemployment contribution loss. As we discuss later in the
paper concentrating on the average loss masques the full distributional effect of income
losses due to unemployment.
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During the period covered by our data, 1980-2002, important changes in the
demographics of the labor force occurred, especially changes in the labor force
participation of women. From January 1979 to December 2002 the female labor force
participation rate for women over 20 years old, increased from 50.1 percent to 60.6
percent. This large increase in the number of women working outside the home created
many new economic opportunities for women. Table 5 illustrates the cohort effects of
women in our sample. These new economic opportunities also created new retirement
savings opportunities. In general, the younger women cohort earned more than the older
women cohort and had more retirement savings as a result.

In every case women who were 26-30 years old in 1980 (young cohort) outperformed the
older cohort, those 42-46 in 1980. Their unemployment experiences are identical (by
construct) so we can attribute all of the differences to earnings. By contrast men in these
cohorts experienced a decline in labor force participation during this time, from 80.1 to
75.9 percent participation from January 1979 to December 2002. We also see that the
older cohort has considerably more retirement income than the younger cohort. In
general, women have considerably less retirement income than men. The estimated
gender ratio in retirement income by quartile is much higher for the younger cohort
relative to the older cohort. However, despite this narrowing gap, younger women in our
model accrue 73 cents for every dollar that men accrue in retirement savings –
approximately equal to the unadjusted gender pay gap.
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The effect of unemployment on retirement savings losses is inadequately described by the
average. Since the losses are bounded by zero the loss distribution is right-skewed, the
result of which is to raise the average relative to the median. While average losses are
approximately 10 percent, median losses in retirement savings for first quartile men
(women) is 5.6 (5.9) percent and for fourth quartile men (women) this loss is 4.2 (4.5)
percent.

While losses are modest for those in the middle of the loss distribution, our model shows
considerable losses for those at the tail ends of the loss distribution. At the 95th percentile
of losses, five percent of workers will experience retirement savings losses between 12
and 15 percent. At the tail end of the distribution, the 99th percentile of losses represents
reductions in retirement savings ranging from 18-20 percent. We also note that
percentage losses are greatest for those in the 3rd quartile of earnings. This is largely due
to the downward wage mobility some workers experience after a spell of unemployment.
A combination of moderate unemployment incidence and wage decline lead these
workers to be the potentially biggest losers under a DC type pension plan.

We extend our distributional analysis to the timing effects discussed previously. We find
rather stark differences in the timing effects for winners and losers. Workers with small
losses typically have positive timing effects. That is, if the spells of unemployment were
randomly distributed losses would have been larger, so that the timing of unemployment
helped ameliorate the losses. However, for workers with losses above the 40th percentile
have negative timing effects. Of particular interest is our finding that the timing effect
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grows as the unemployment losses mount. Graph 4 illustrates the timing losses relative to
the loss due to unemployment. For each quartile the trend is nearly the same, a timing
effect that helps ameliorate losses for the first 3 deciles followed by increasingly large
losses. While there are a couple of data points that fail to fit this scenario the overall trend
is too strong to ignore. In general, winners win in both the total losses and timing of the
losses; while losers lose. We should note that this finding is not an artifact of our
analysis; it is just as likely that timing effects could have consistently hurt small losers
while helping those that lose a lot. Our analysis indicates that fortune is not so fair.

Finally, table 6 shows the total accumulation and annuity payments a worker would
receive based on our savings rates and return. For simplicity, we return to the average
losses for each quartile. Young men in the lowest earning quartile would receive a
reduction in their annuity payment of $152 per month, for similarly situated women the
reduction in $104. We present these numbers to illustrate that most workers would do
very well in their retirement under the assumption set out in our simulation. This is
particularly true for those with unemployment and timing losses near the median of the
loss distribution. However, the right tail of this distribution represents considerable
savings losses on the order of 15 percent. Under these conditions and coupled with other
risks that may coalesce around an unlucky individuals savings losses could be
considerable.
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5.0 Conclusions

Our simulations of retirement savings find that lower income workers’ unemployment
experiences and timing of unemployment spells (especially for low income men) result in
considerable savings losses relative to a baseline case of no unemployment. Lower
income workers experience the largest percentage declines of retirement savings ranging
from 8.0 and 7.2 percent for men and women in the lowest quartile of earnings, while
workers in the highest quartile of earnings experienced losses of 4.6 percent (men) and
3.0 percent (women). Equally important we find that the timing of unemployment spells
amplified income losses by forcing workers out of the labor market during periods of
relatively low equity prices. In the absence of these timing effects, retirement savings
losses would have been 8-12 percent larger.

We believe our estimates understate the true retirement savings losses associated with
unemployment. In our simulations we assume that workers in all quartiles of earnings
have equal facility in managing their retirement portfolio, that workers experiencing
unemployment do not “raid” their retirement savings, spells of unemployment cannot
exceed 26 weeks. All of these assumptions are likely to result in an understatement of
retirement income losses; this is especially true for the lowest earning workers who
experience more unemployment. Of equal importance is the effect at the tail end of the
loss distribution. While the average effect hovers at six percent or so, losses for some
workers will exceed 12 percent.
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Our model has a number of shortcomings, the effects of which are unclear, ex ante. We
assume that while unemployment probabilities are a function of earnings quartiles,
unemployment duration is not. If higher income workers experience longer but less
frequent spells of unemployment our results would show larger losses for higher earnings
workers. Finally, we do not allow workers to alter their portfolios in order to diversify
away some of their employment income risk. However, it is unclear to us that allowing
workers with risky income streams to balance their portfolio with less risky assets would
raise overall retirement savings.

This research has a number of important policy implications. The increasing prominence
of defined contribution plans and continued debate about privatizing Social Security
impose new risks on workers. It is true that unemployment-risk exists in both defined
benefit plans and with Social Security but both have mechanisms that protect vested
workers retirement savings. For DB plans, once a person is fully vested, benefits are
more or less guaranteed. In the case of Social Security, only a subset of quarters of
earnings is used in calculating benefits, and the benefit formula is strongly progressive.
This has the effect of compensating for lower earnings and not counting many periods of
zero income (like unemployment). Of particular note, the Social Security Administration
allows workers to drop the lowest five years of earnings from their lifetime earnings
before calculating benefits. Our results show that all worker types are unemployed for
periods which are much less than this provided allowance. No such assurances are
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available in DC plans; our research implies that workers in the lowest earnings quartiles
are likely to need these types of consideration the most.
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Table 1:

Average Loss in Retirement Accumulation by Earnings Quartile & Gender
Contributions Fixed at $333 per month.
Avg Monthly
Contribution

Dollar
Loss

Percentage
Loss

Unemployment
Over Career

Male

Quartile 1
Quartile 2
Quartile 3
Quartile 4

constant
"

$50,784
$40,160
$34,585
$28,995

8.0%
6.4%
5.5%
4.6%

7.3%
5.6%
4.8%
4.1%

Female

Quartile 1
Quartile 2
Quartile 3
Quartile 4

constant
"

$45,715
$33,955
$27,342
$19,085

7.2%
5.4%
4.3%
3.0%

6.6%
4.8%
3.8%
2.8%

Dollar values amplified to show 40 year career equivalents in year 2000 dollars.
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Table 2:

Average Loss in Retirement Accumulation by Earnings Quartile & Gender
Proportional Contributions at 10% of Observed Earnings - Workers Remain in Quartile Throughout Career
Avg Monthly
Contribution

Avg Dollar
Loss

Percentage
Loss

Unemployment
Over Career

Total
Savings

Male

Quartile 1
Quartile 2
Quartile 3
Quartile 4

$140.23
$222.64
$309.00
$462.18

$20,746
$25,377
$29,776
$35,752

8.0%
6.3%
5.4%
4.5%

7.4%
5.6%
4.8%
4.1%

$260,036
$404,434
$551,085
$793,163

Female

Quartile 1
Quartile 2
Quartile 3
Quartile 4

$106.26
$159.32
$226.27
$350.99

$14,126
$15,336
$17,078
$17,878

7.2%
5.3%
4.3%
3.0%

6.6%
4.8%
3.8%
2.8%

$196,200
$287,249
$398,432
$599,709

Earnings derived from CPS ORG for workers ages: 26 - 30 in 1980.
Dollar values amplified to show 40 year career equivalents in year 2000 dollars.
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Table 3:

Average Loss in Retirement Accumulation by Beginning Earnings Quartile & Gender
Proportional Contributions at 10% of Worker Specific Earnings- Allowing for Quartile Switching
Median
Dollar
Loss

Average
Dollar
Loss

Percentage
Loss

Unemployment
Over
Career

FullEmployment
Savings

Male

Quartile 1
Quartile 2
Quartile 3
Quartile 4

$21,802
$23,734
$25,971
$28,722

$24,471
$26,354
$28,979
$32,548

6.1%
5.9%
5.0%
5.1%

5.8%
5.5%
4.8%
4.6%

$400,574
$446,049
$582,123
$632,943

Female

Quartile 1
Quartile 2
Quartile 3
Quartile 4

$16,333
$17,244
$18,861
$21,404

$18,370
$19,200
$21,040
$24,281

6.1%
5.9%
5.7%
5.2%

5.8%
5.5%
5.2%
4.7%

$301,559
$325,725
$372,032
$466,796

Heterogeneous individual earnings derived from CPS ORG for workers ages: 26 - 30 in 1980.
Dollar values amplified to show 40 year career equivalents in year 2000 dollars.
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Table 4:

Unemployment Spells, Marginal Investment Losses During Unemployment Spells

Time

Average Losses
Unemployment

Total

Timing
as a Percent
of Total Loss

Male

Quartile 1
Quartile 2
Quartile 3
Quartile 4

27.8
26.4
24.8
22.3

$23,095
$24,413
$26,429
$29,621

$24,471
$26,354
$28,979
$32,548

6.0%
8.0%
9.6%
9.9%

Female

Quartile 1
Quartile 2
Quartile 3
Quartile 4

27.6
26.4
24.8
22.5

$17,298
$17,841
$19,237
$22,104

$18,370
$19,200
$21,040
$24,281

6.2%
7.6%
9.4%
9.8%

Heterogeneous individual earnings derived from CPS ORG for workers ages: 26 - 30 in 1980.
Dollar and time values amplified to show 40 year career equivalents.
Year 2000 dollars.
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Table 5:

Losses in Context of Annuitization of Balances
Full
Employment
Savings

Monthly
Annuity
Payment

Observed
Average
Losses

Monthly
Net
Payment

Monthly
Annuitized
Loss

Average
Percent
Loss

Male

Quartile 1
Quartile 2
Quartile 3
Quartile 4

$400,574
$446,049
$582,123
$632,943

$2,902
$3,231
$4,217
$4,585

$24,471
$26,354
$28,979
$32,548

$2,725
$3,040
$4,007
$4,349

$177
$191
$210
$236

6.1%
5.9%
5.0%
5.1%

Female

Quartile 1
Quartile 2
Quartile 3
Quartile 4

$301,559
$325,725
$372,032
$466,796

$2,185
$2,360
$2,695
$3,382

$18,370
$19,200
$21,040
$24,281

$2,052
$2,221
$2,543
$3,206

$133
$139
$152
$176

6.1%
5.9%
5.6%
5.2%

Younger workers were aged 26-30 in 1980
Duration hazards constant across cohorts, contributions proportional to income
Annuity calculations based on Federal Thrift Savings Plan at:
age 65, 4.125% return, single life, level payment.
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Chart 1: Asynchronous Equities & Labor Markets (stylized example)

Level

Equities Market
Labor Market

Time
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Graph 2: Simulated Retirement Savings Losses, Men
Constant Portfolio, Stochastic Unemployment, Quartile Switching
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Graph 3: Simulated Retirement Savings Losses, Women
Constant Portfolio, Stochastic Unemployment, Quartile Switching
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Graph 4: Timing Losses as a Percent of Unemployment Losses, Men
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Appendix A:

Labor Mobility by Earnings Quartile from Matched CPS ORG files
Men

Starting Quartile =1

Transition
Quartile

1
2
3
4

1994
52.7
24.8
15.0
9.7

1996
54.4
20.9
12.0
9.4

1998
56.6
25.4
8.1
5.8

2000
51.2
23.1
8.1
6.0

2002
59.8
22.4
13.8
6.2

2004
52.6
22.8
12.7
8.8

Average
54.54
23.23
11.62
7.65

1
2
3
4

1994
29.4
34.2
20.7
10.8

1996
34.3
36.7
23.0
9.7

1998
29.5
42.2
24.2
5.9

2000
29.0
41.8
25.3
8.6

2002
28.7
39.7
19.1
8.9

2004
32.6
38.5
20.0
7.9

30.60
38.82
22.06
8.64

1
2
3
4

1994
14.0
31.9
35.6
20.9

1996
7.3
32.0
35.3
21.3

1998
9.3
28.3
41.6
18.7

2000
14.5
25.9
41.2
16.8

2002
9.0
29.2
40.9
19.8

2004
12.4
30.6
40.5
16.6

11.09
29.64
39.19
19.04

1
2
3
4

1994
3.9
9.2
28.7
58.6

1996
4.0
10.4
29.7
59.7

1998
4.6
4.2
26.1
69.6

2000
5.3
9.2
25.5
68.6

2002
2.6
8.7
26.2
65.1

2004
2.3
8.2
26.8
66.6

3.77
8.31
27.14
64.68

Starting Quartile =2
Transition
Quartile

Starting Quartile =3
Transition
Quartile

Starting Quartile =4
Transition
Quartile

Women
Starting Quartile =1

Transition
Quartile

1
2
3
4

1994
47.1
24.7
13.7
9.2

1996
50.6
17.9
14.1
10.1

1998
55.2
22.1
10.1
7.7

2000
49.8
25.7
11.3
6.7

2002
46.8
30.2
12.3
6.9

2004
46.6
24.6
12.9
10.0

49.35
24.19
12.40
8.44

1
2
3
4

1994
30.2
37.4
22.3
13.5

1996
33.9
42.9
18.2
9.4

1998
31.2
43.1
15.6
8.0

2000
30.4
43.7
18.8
5.9

2002
33.3
35.3
27.6
9.7

2004
34.4
38.9
22.1
9.4

32.25
40.22
20.77
9.31

1
2
3
4

1994
15.0
25.3
37.3
18.4

1996
12.4
24.2
43.7
16.6

1998
10.5
24.4
45.4
17.7

2000
13.6
20.8
45.3
19.1

2002
16.2
26.0
33.3
13.6

2004
12.8
27.9
40.0
20.0

13.43
24.75
40.81
17.57

1
2
3
4

1994
7.7
12.7
26.8
58.9

1996
3.0
15.1
24.0
63.9

1998
3.1
10.4
28.9
66.6

2000
6.2
9.9
24.6
68.3

2002
3.7
8.4
26.9
69.7

2004
6.2
8.6
25.0
60.6

4.98
10.85
26.02
64.68

Starting Quartile =2
Transition
Quartile

Starting Quartile =3
Transition
Quartile

Starting Quartile =4
Transition
Quartile

Average values (derived above) are used to predict labor mobility from last previous quartile just
prior to most recent unemployment spell.
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